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1. INTRODUCTION
The chapter integrates insights from complexity theory into the economics of technologi-
cal knowledge in order to refl ect systematically on the variety of forms and processes 
that underpin knowledge production, dissemination and coordination. In so doing the 
chapter brings together two complementary bodies of scholarly research: the analysis 
of multiple interactions occurring within network- type structures which is typical of the 
literature on complex dynamic systems; on the other hand the study of learning proc-
esses as intentional, mindful and purposive behaviors set in motion by myopic agents, 
which is at heart of the economics of innovation. For what concerns the formalization of 
structured interactions and the emergence of networks we draw from complexity theory 
and emphasize the intentional nature of those interactions aimed at sourcing external 
knowledge and competences, and integrating them in the extant repertoires. In this view 
actors possess limited resources and knowledge, and their ability to innovate is contin-
gent to the implementation of selective interactions by means of research, development 
and learning processes.
Complexity theories emerge in economics as a response to the need of understanding 
systematically the dynamics of innovation and technological knowledge taking place 
in increasingly dispersed contexts (see Chapter 1 in this volume). This approach facili-
tates the appreciation of both structural and dynamic properties of evolving economic 
systems; the changing forms of interaction across actors are crucial for the evolution of 
the system at the aggregate level as much as the changing characteristics of individual 
actors at micro level. The network of interactions between agents is central to accessing 
and creating new knowledge, and in particular exploiting complementarities with other 
organizations embedded in the network. Innovative fi rms are therefore able to select and 
manage effi  ciently external linkages while implementing learning processes enabled by 
both external linkages and strategic investments in technological communication with 
other organizations.
These complex nets of interactions and the transformation that their structures 
undergo call for purposeful coordination in order to reap the potential of knowledge 
creation and dissemination that is typical of diverse environments. The chapter focuses 
on innovation platforms, that is, systemic infrastructures for the organization and coor-
dination of distributed innovation processes. Their recent emergence responds to the 
rationale of maximizing variety in the ecology of knowledge types while maintaining 
coherence by means of some degree of hierarchy. In platform- type structures, key nodes 
are crucial in determining at once the relative contribution of peripheral units as well as 
the performance of the whole system. There is growing evidence on the signifi cance of 
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innovation platforms in diff erent sectoral contexts where innovation and the successful 
exploitation of new technological knowledge require integrating a variety of complemen-
tary competences.
To analyse this phenomenon the chapter taps into two complementary bodies of 
 scholarly research: the analysis of multiple interactions occurring within collective struc-
tures, which is typical of the literature on complex dynamic systems, and the study of 
learning processes as purposive behaviors set in motion by myopic agents, which stands 
at heart of the economics of innovation. More to the point, our study builds on the 
appreciation of three distinctive dynamic structural properties of innovation platforms: 
hierarchical causation; coordinated variety; and selective openness. The juxtaposition of 
these three, it is argued, shapes the structure of non- redundant connections that make up 
innovation platforms. The chapter is structured as follows. Section 1 introduces the basic 
conceptual framework; section 2 overviews the literature on complexity and its connec-
tion with innovation and technological change with various articulations in relation to 
intertwined organizational and cognitive dynamics. Section 3 introduces the concept 
of innovation platform and the underpinning component processes. The last section 
 concludes and summarizes.
2. BACKGROUND
Let us begin with a concise appreciation of the fact that the nature of the innovation 
process has changed over the last two decades.1 Three of those changes deserve closer 
attention. The fi rst is that products, services and processes have progressively drawn 
on wider ranges of constituent parts and, a fortiori, of knowledge bases. This phenom-
enon is ascribed to the search for both cost reductions and diff erentiation as well as 
to increased availability of specialized components. The second type of change is the 
growing tendency of products, services and processes to be used in symbiotic fashion. 
The resulting trajectory is one in which products that were originally conceived as 
meeting diff erent needs co- exist in a systemic context of use. Yet one more important 
change concerns the type of knowledge that best enables and facilitates innovation in 
such a fast- changing scenario. It is clear that combined together the fi rst two points entail 
for individual fi rms the challenge to enlarge the range of capabilities while at the same 
time preserving  internal coherence.
Summing up, as the technological complexity embedded in products and services 
increases and the contexts of use grow diverse while remaining symbiotic, other things 
being equal, the reliance of a fi rm on its own resources does necessarily diminish. These 
phenomena are widely discussed in the scholarly debate, especially in two areas of 
research. The fi rst is the theory of complex systems, whose convergence towards social 
sciences began in the 1990s under the pressure of economists who sought to understand 
the dynamics of collective processes. These approaches adopt as a unit of analysis the 
interactions across the components rather than the individual parts; such interactions, 
in turn, defi ne the criteria of access to as well as the rules that govern cooperation within 
collective environments. In the evolution of complex systems the aggregate and the 
individual dimensions are intertwined (Arthur et al., 1997; Foster, 2005). The corollary 
is that the architecture of such systems is not a datum but rather a dynamic, emergent 
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property stemming from the coordination of a myriad individual characteristics and 
behaviours.
The economics of innovation is the second body of work that is most directly relevant 
to the phenomena discussed before. In a nutshell this area of scholarly research aims at 
understanding how wealth is created from human knowledge. The starting point is that 
economic agents are boundedly rational, and deal with innate uncertainty by building 
on experience and learning to develop skills and decision rules (Simon, 1962; Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Loasby, 1998; Antonelli, 2008). Strong emphasis is placed in this context 
on the sources of human knowledge, on the procedures by which this is applied to solve 
specifi c problems, and on the eff ects that the latter bears on the context of application. A 
crucial point, diff erent from other approaches to economic agency, is that these interac-
tions are explicitly embedded in a context, that is to say, a time and a place. Accordingly 
the relevant metric for these processes is historical – as opposed to spatial (see O’Driscoll 
and Rizzo, 1985) – time: the gist of economic actions is the development of cognitive 
processes and of associated choices along an irreversible time arrow.
This frame entails a view of human agency that is of development and not of mere 
allocation, and elucidates on the trait d’union between the two approaches. To bring 
the argument home, a staple of the economics of innovation is that as individual actors 
possess limited resources and knowledge, they necessarily need to search, develop and 
establish interactions in evolving environments. Moreover like complex systems theory, 
the economics of technological change focuses on non- deterministic, multi- level rela-
tionships which are a necessary but not suffi  cient condition to organize successfully for 
innovation.
From the foregoing discussion it is clear that in dynamic environments character-
ized by recurrent changes in product characteristics and production technologies, the 
internal capabilities of individual fi rms hardly suffi  ce. It is also clear that strategies for 
the governance of knowledge are critical for survival (Pavitt, 2002; Antonelli, 2008). To 
this end fi rms deepen specialization and establish connections to access and contribute 
to collective knowledge. New knowledge is facilitated by complementarities, rather 
than substitutability, between internal and external knowledge: the greater the scale of 
networking, the more intense the internal know- how needed to understand, command 
and recombine external capabilities (Patrucco, 2008). On the basis of prospective costs 
associated to changes in their knowledge base, fi rms position themselves along a strategic 
spectrum whose extremes are either vertical integration or the market.
Notwithstanding the widespread signifi cance of vertical disintegration, some forms 
of production and provision cannot be served effi  ciently by market mechanisms and 
managed through vertical disintegration and total outsourcing only. Hybrid solutions, 
like networks, are more appropriate when the design of inter- organizational relation-
ships seeks to minimize costs due to external coordination, and to maximize the creative 
contribution of individual fi rms (Langlois, 1992). In turn, complex dynamic systems 
feature simultaneous availability of the outlined options and cyclical adaptation of stra-
tegic designs (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004). Put another way, decision- making in such 
contexts is driven by ‘dynamic’ coordination, that is, by generative interactions that 
facilitate changes in production, technologies, networks of suppliers, and in the modules 
of relevant knowledge (Lane and Maxfi eld, 1997; Loasby, 2002; Potts, 2001).
The paper illustrates the case of innovation platforms, an emerging form of knowledge 
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governance which has captured the attention of scholars and policy- makers alike in 
recent years.
2.1 Complex Systems and the Dynamics of Knowledge
The theory of complexity is progressively emerging in the evolutionary economics of 
innovation as a new paradigm able to explain the structural and dynamic properties 
of knowledge generation and diff usion as well as the related emergence of innovation. 
Complexity theory is intrinsically both systemic and dynamic, and may be most useful in 
the understanding of the characteristics and processes of knowledge creation, diff usion 
and exploitation, as well as the emergence and transformation of architectures for the 
coordination of knowledge through time (Antonelli, 2008).
In broad terms, complex economic systems can be defi ned as a set of heterogeneous 
actors that interact in order to create new knowledge as well as to organize and change 
their activities through time. However, a closer look at the properties of complex systems 
highlights a variety of intertwining elements within complex systems. First, actors within 
complex systems are heterogeneous in terms of the competencies and knowledge they 
possess; second and consequently, actors have access only to portions of knowledge 
that are feasible through the cognitive map underpinning their search heuristics. In this 
sense they use limited cognitive resources and create new knowledge through trial and 
error and continuous revision of their behaviours. Third, interaction between heteroge-
neous actors is central to the eff ect of both creating and enabling access to knowledge. 
Moreover, these interactions occur in a local space defi ned by shared economic, social, 
technological, cognitive and geographical settings. Because of this, the behaviours of 
actors will likely feature some degree of infl exibility and stickiness in adapting and 
reacting to changes in the environment. In particular, the structure of the environment 
bounds such adaptation and reaction and in turn the conduct of actors is limited by 
 irreversibility (Arthur et al., 1997; Rosser, 1999).
Recent advances in the evolutionary school provide major contributions to integrate 
and improve such understanding. Evolutionary economists built upon Nelson and 
Winter’s (1982) analysis by developing the idea that the features of economic change are 
biased by the behavior of actors with idiosyncratic competencies, especially with regard 
to innovative capabilities and technological skills. Each fi rm is distinct and unique with 
respect to the technological knowledge and the ability to introduce innovation. Therefore 
there is very limited interchangeability and substitutability, high complementarity and 
strong specialization and diff erentiation in the space of technological competencies.
Along this line, the integration of the analysis of the characteristics of knowledge and 
of the process of knowledge creation is a major step forward in the understanding of the 
dynamic properties of complex economic systems. When looked at through the lenses of 
the complexity perspective the infrastructures aimed at the creation and use of techno-
logical knowledge are characterized by (1) intrinsic and radical uncertainty, that is, the 
mismatch between fi rms’ expectations, planned strategies and actual results (for instance 
because of failures in facing changes in consumers’ needs through new products), and (2) 
non- decomposability, that is, complex systems are irreducible systems, where the behav-
ior and performance of a single actor may aff ect the behavior and performance of the 
entire system. Although agents are myopic and characterized by irreversibility in their 
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choices and behaviors, they are also creative and can react to unplanned and unexpected 
interdependencies typical of complex environments. Imagination and creativity are 
required in order to introduce changes in the environment as well as for the environment 
itself to evolve. In turn, the changes and the evolution of both the system and the behav-
iors of agents can be understood only in historical time: complex systems are intrinsi-
cally dynamic. In a dynamic perspective, therefore, in such systems the behaviors of 
individual agents and the evolution of the environment shape each other because of the 
interaction between individual creativity and structural irreversibility. The dynamics of 
complex systems depends upon the interaction both between micro and macro elements, 
and between individual actors themselves (Foster, 1993, 2005; Loasby, 2002; Lane and 
Maxfi eld, 2005; Antonelli, 2007; Arthur, 2007; Hanusch and Pyka, 2007).
Complex economic systems are characterized by non- ergodicity, social interactions, 
phase transition and emergent properties. Non- ergodic path dependency applies when 
a little shock at one point in time, and not necessarily at the onset of the process, aff ects 
the long run dynamics of a system. Phase transitions consist in qualitative changes that 
can be determined by small changes in the parameters of the system. Emergent properties 
are properties of a system that apply at a specifi c level of aggregation of a system. In the 
theory of complexity, feedback and interactions play a key role in assessing the conduct 
of agents and specifi cally the chances of changing their behavior2 (Durlauf, 2005).
Most importantly, complex dynamic systems are distinguished by processes of true 
transformation (rather than mere transition), where the changes in the system aff ect both 
the properties of the architecture of the system and the properties of its entities, namely 
fi rms and organizations. The dynamics of complex systems are based on evolutionary 
processes that are not driven by variety and selection (as traditionally in evolutionary 
thinking) but by diff erentiation of the activities of actors and the changes in the insti-
tutions that coordinate the division of labor among those actors. In other words, two 
kinds of diff erentiation are at work here: (1) diff erentiation in the functional and techno-
logical specialization of fi rms; (2) diff erentiation in the architecture of the system. These 
transform the relationships between actors, in turn transforming the architecture of the 
system, that is, the structure of interactions between actors. The two processes clearly 
co- evolve by means of the feedbacks between the behaviors of actors and the architecture 
of the system in which fi rms are embedded. Such a co- evolution qualifi es the openness of 
the system and the coordinating architecture (Lane et al., 2009; Metcalfe, 2007).
The structural and dynamic characteristics of complex systems involve the integration 
of diff erent and complementary elements and components, which in turn refl ect diff erent 
and complementary spaces of technological competencies. Individual actors put in place 
connections in order to access and generate new knowledge, and thus to react to cogni-
tive and structural boundaries and the changes that have occurred in the environment. 
Learning takes place in myopic (that is, characterized by limited and specifi c knowl-
edge), but creative fi rms and this learning underpins the generation of new knowledge. 
The process of creation of new knowledge relies upon the complementarity between 
internal and external portions of knowledge (Patrucco, 2009). The larger the adoption 
of networking as a means to access and use external knowledge modules, the larger 
the complementary internal know- how required by the fi rm to be able to understand, 
command and recombine these modules of external knowledge. Increasing returns in the 
generation of new knowledge build upon the exploitation of complementarities between 
M2602 - ANTONELLI TEXT.indd   205 16/03/2011   13:46
206  Handbook on the economic complexity of technological change
internal and external knowledge and the implementation of a collective pool of knowl-
edge and competencies through interactions (Patrucco, 2008). In turn, creative fi rms 
benefi ting from complementary modules of knowledge are able not only to introduce 
new knowledge but also to change the structure of their connections and the architecture 
of the network in which they are embedded, eventually modifying the processes and 
mechanisms of coordination.
In this respect, interactive learning from external sources provides new ideas able 
either to improve existing technologies or to be the basis for the development of brand 
new ones. Knowledge creation is not only a collective process, that is, depending upon 
the contribution of diff erent and complementary actors, but also a recombinant, cumu-
lative and path- dependent one (Weitzman, 1996, 1998). The creation of new knowledge 
is seen as building upon itself through the new recombination of existing ideas. Such 
recombination is clearly aff ected by both the structural characteristics of the network in 
which it takes place and the historical sequence of previous combinations of ideas.
Focusing on the organization of knowledge interactions, rather than merely on the 
structure of their net is a crucial analytical shift in order to grasp the causes and the 
consequences of the changing structure, composition and coordination of the system 
in which actors interplay (see Chapter 1 in this volume). The network of interactions 
between agents is the central mechanism through which they can access and create new 
knowledge, exploiting complementarities. Changes in the organization and structure 
of this network, introduced by myopic but creative agents as a response to modifi ca-
tion in their environment, induce changes in the institutions of coordination of com-
plementary activities and competencies. The feedbacks between micro behaviors and 
the structural boundaries of the system in turn shape the evolution of the system itself 
(Arthur, 2009).
Economic complexity is an emerging phenomenon that is the outcome of a continu-
ously transforming process of interaction between fi rms, each of which is characterized 
by diff erent capabilities and placed in a diff erent technological domain. The notion of the 
coordination of knowledge is central in this context, in order to understand in which way 
complex systems evolve and the dynamics of knowledge creation and change take place. 
Knowledge coordination occurs through the generative structure of interactions between 
actors and the changes in such networks operated by bounded but creative actors (Lane 
and Maxfi eld, 1997).
The notion of coalitions for innovation has been recently outlined (Antonelli, 2010) 
precisely to shift attention to the role that the coordination of inter- organizational link-
ages has on the implementation of eff ective innovation as well as the generation of new 
productive and technological knowledge. When innovation and knowledge are collective 
features of the interactions between diff erent actors, eff ective coalitions for innovation 
align the heterogeneous capabilities of the partners embedded in the network and achieve 
the mutual directedness of their strategic interactions in order to guarantee the cohesion 
and the coordination of the complex net of interactions that characterizes the innova-
tion process, as well as to cope with the structural uncertainty of the innovation process 
through some degree of hierarchical authority and power centrality in the network.
The next sub- section frames the analysis of the diff erent modes through which eco-
nomic actors can organize and govern technological knowledge. This paves the way for 
introducing and articulating the concept of ‘innovation platforms’ in section 3.
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2.2 Governing Technological Knowledge: Integration, Modularity and Networking
The analysis of the organization of innovative activities and the management of knowl-
edge generation and diff usion in complex systems has been at the centre of an intense 
and rich debate between scholars about how technological knowledge can be successfully 
coordinated and which is the more eff ective organizational form through which fi rms 
can acquire and manage their innovative and productive capabilities in particular. As is 
well known, three types of organization received attention in the literature: the vertically 
integrated fi rm, the market- based and modular organization, and the hybrids such as 
networks and collaborative ventures.
The role of managerial authority, command and hierarchy has been central through 
almost the entire twentieth century and diff erent authors have argued that the verti-
cally integrated fi rm is a superior solution, either because of scale, scope and learning 
economies in R&D (Penrose, 1959; Chandler, 1990) or because, as David Teece (1984) 
argued, it is more effi  cient in managing radical (or ‘systemic’, to use his words) innova-
tion. According to the defi nition introduced by Teece (1984), a new product or technol-
ogy that requires changes in diff erent and connected elements of the system in which it 
will be placed, can be defi ned as a systemic innovation – in contrast to ‘autonomous’ 
innovations that easily fi t into the system already existing without calling for conse-
quent, diff used and simultaneous changes elsewhere in the system. Following this work, 
in the literature about the organization and management of innovation, it has been 
often presumed that the more radical or ‘systemic’ the innovation, the more appropriate 
and effi  cient is vertical integration and the coordination of the change within a single 
organization.
However, more recently innovation scholars rediscovered the seminal work of Herbert 
Simon (Simon, 1962, 2002) on modularity, and shifted their attention to the wide range 
of decentralized and ‘market- based’ or ‘virtual’ (for example, Chesbrough and Teece, 
1996) organizations opened up by the vanishing out of large fi rms (Langlois, 2002, 2003). 
Herbert Simon, through his frequently cited example of Tempus and Hora (Simon, 
1962: 470) defi ned the notion of near- decomposability and claimed that a complex 
system is composed by diff erent modules – or sub- systems – in such a way that interac-
tions between sub- systems are much weaker than interactions within sub- systems (that 
is, between elements of the same sub- systems). Modules are almost independent of one 
another and changes occurring in one element of the system do not aff ect either the other 
elements or the overall structure of the system.3
Elaborating upon Simon’s perspective, in recent years the economics and managerial 
literature on modularity distilled and addressed the benefi ts that make modular organi-
zational structures and contracts- based relations between buyer and suppliers more 
suitable than vertical integration (for example, Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Arora, 
Gambardella and Rullani, 1998; Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004; Langlois and Garzarelli, 
2008). In particular, Baldwin and Clark (1997) and Langlois (2002) view the organization 
of production and innovation through modular strategies as the more effi  cient way to 
manage extremely complex and otherwise troublesome organizations and technologies.
When systems grow extensively and the interconnections between the diff erent ele-
ments and sub- systems become so numerous, their coordination under an integrated 
structure is almost unfeasible. In such circumstances, fi rms can switch from integrated 
M2602 - ANTONELLI TEXT.indd   207 16/03/2011   13:46
208  Handbook on the economic complexity of technological change
to modular strategies for acquiring and coordinating their productive and innovative 
capabilities, in relation to the changing characteristics of the technologies and the com-
petencies they build upon in order to introduce novelty (for example, Chesbrough and 
Teece, 1996). The more interconnected and articulated are the knowledge bases and 
technologies necessary to innovate – that is, according to the view of Herbert Simon, 
the more complex is the system – the more advantageous is the adoption of a modular 
organization and the use of formal contracts and market transactions.
However, various contributions highlighted that the literature on modular and 
contract- based organizations underestimates the important eff ects that interdependen-
cies between fi rms (for example, Kogut and Zander, 1996; Stacey, 1995), as well as inertia 
(Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001) and high switching costs (Gilson, Sabel and Scott, 2009) 
have on the coordination of knowledge.
In this respect, innovation scholars are reaching increasing consensus about the 
fact that inter- fi rm ties exploit resource heterogeneity and reduce the disadvantages of 
accessing dispersed and diverse sources of knowledge, enabling therefore new knowledge 
creation, by combining the fl exibility of markets with the visible hand of organization 
(Powell, 1990; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Powell, Koput and Smith- Doerr, 1996; Uzzi, 
1997; Ahuja, 2000; Burt, 2000; Kogut, 2000).
Contributions have paid attention to the qualitative structure of the network and the 
role played by individual actors, thus identifying diff erent network structures and their 
relative advantages. In particular, two confi gurations have been contrasted in the litera-
ture: networks characterized by what Coleman (1990) described as structures with strong 
and redundant ties have been opposed to Burt’s (1992) ‘structural holes’ and structures 
characterized by weak and non- redundant ties.4
Brusoni and Prencipe (2001) elaborated upon the contrasting evidence about which 
kind of network is better equipped to organize the accumulation and acquisition of 
knowledge, and with a special emphasis on complex environments, revisited the notion 
of loosely coupled networks (Orton and Weick, 1990).
Orton and Weick (1990) describe the structure of inter- fi rm networks according to the 
degree of responsiveness and distinctiveness networks show. They defi ne distinctiveness 
as the ability to command and produce a range of complementary technological com-
petences in order to introduce novelty, while responsiveness is the active and intentional 
management of inter- fi rm relations to provide the network with cohesion, and to coordi-
nate diff erent sources of learning.
If there is neither responsiveness nor distinctiveness, the system is not really a system and it 
can be defi ned as a non- coupled system. If there is responsiveness without distinctiveness, the 
system is tightly coupled. If there is distinctiveness without responsiveness, the system is decou-
pled. If there is both distinctiveness and responsiveness, the system is loosely coupled (Orton 
and Weick, 1990: 205, quoted in Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001: 1026).
We argue that innovation platforms share some of the properties of loosely coupled 
networks in that they combine elements of both modular and integrated systems, as well 
as of sparse and dense networks. Innovation platforms are characterized by structural 
holes, arbitrating through a hierarchy the interactions between organizations that are 
not directly connected. In this regard, for example, system integrators fi rms (Sturgeon, 
2002; Prencipe et al., 2003), that are well known in a number of sectors, such as the 
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automobile, software and PC, microelectronics, and aviation industries, are a defi ned 
specifi c type of structural holes at the center of the recombinatorial fl ows of diff erent 
bodies of technological knowledge in complex innovations. However, the increasing 
division of labour brought about by complexity in both products and knowledge engen-
ders an increase in the number of specifi c components and bodies of knowledge that 
need to be recombined in the fi nal product. Redundant connections are often necessary 
in order to complement diff erent specialized skills and directly share the relevant knowl-
edge among diff erent fi rms in the systems. Direct collaboration, that is, not mediated by 
a structural hole, between for instance two specialized suppliers, can be necessary to co- 
defi ne and co- implement a new component or a sub- system of a complex product. In this 
case the network has some features of the dense and fl at structure described by Coleman 
and Uzzi. Here, specialization requires the broadening of the knowledge base of system 
integrators as coordinating organizations in order both to understand innovations and 
knowledge sourced externally and to manage the network of outsourced components 
and sub- systems of technologies and knowledge. The competence of a system integrator 
in this case involves the ability to govern the networked process by which innovations are 
collectively produced and shared (Kogut, 2000). In this regard, networks where system 
integrators play as central brokers do not suff er the weaknesses of pure modular strate-
gies, where the system is conceived as easily decoupled in interdependent chunks.
The remainder of the chapter illustrates the case of innovation platforms as organiza-
tional forms aimed at the coordination of collective and distributed innovation activities. 
Because of the coordinating role played by central nodes, innovation platforms combine 
elements of hierarchical coordination and elements of decentralization of innovative and 
productive capabilities, based either on modular outsourcing and market transactions, 
or on collaborations. Let us focus now on their characteristics.
3. INNOVATION PLATFORMS: THE BUILDING BLOCKS
Innovation platforms are systemic infrastructures for the organization and coordination 
of distributed innovation processes that feature high degrees of complexity. The crea-
tion of innovation platforms consists in the design and establishment of architectures 
for inter- organizational coordination (Sah and Stiglitz, 1986, 1988): these defi ne the 
levels of engagement of each peripheral unit, the characteristics of the fl ows (that is, uni-
directional or bidirectional) of information and knowledge, and the extent of exchange 
across organizations.5 The design of a platform determines ex ante but evaluates (and 
eventually adapts) ex post the creation and the use of knowledge (Garicano, 2000). 
Wheelwright and Clark (1992) fi rst talked of platform products whose core design seeks 
to appeal to a large customer base while its openness to marginal modifi cations attempts 
to captivate peripheral users with more specifi c needs. A few years later Kim and Kogut 
(1996) talked about platform technologies referring to models for the coordination of 
complementary components such as computers. Rochet and Tirole (2003) fi rst ventured 
beyond the physical features of artifacts thinking of platforms as a design concept and 
giving them operational functioning with a clear articulation of how products and serv-
ices stand in functional relation to a collective endeavour, and of the mediating role of 
leader organizations within such constructs.
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The phenomenon of collective structures striving for the participation of multiple 
business entities is not new, and platforms are certainly not the fi rst instantiation. 
Modelling of networks has probably been the archetypal point of reference for this class 
of phenomena. Network economics approaches propose that increasing returns to scale 
are at the core of strategic coordination across competing fi rms (Pennings and Harianto, 
1992; Economides, 1996). Networks have higher capacity to manage large- volume trans-
actions compared to closed proprietary circuits, and given a large enough customer base 
the expected profi tability of joining is high and the benefi ts outweigh the costs (Saloner 
and Shepard, 1995; Shy, 2001). A critical assumption underpinning this theory is that 
technologies, like the component organizations, are given and constant. This static view 
leaves out important features for the observed growth of variety in both the network 
participants as well as the kinds of interrelations across them (Consoli, 2008).
Innovation platforms diff er in some crucial aspects from the above characterization. In 
these structures a variety of agents participates in the production and supply of products 
and services; each unit exists independently according to its own goals and capacity but, 
at the same time, responds to a collective goal through shared communication rules. The 
point, though, is that such diff erences across agents matter to a great degree. In turn, the 
architectures in which they operate are fl exible and can be confi gured in diff erent ways 
for diff erent uses, very much akin to computer platforms. A central component for the 
rationale underpinning platforms is maximizing the variety of contributions stemming 
from a variegated knowledge base while maintaining coherence though a minimum level 
of hierarchy. As will be discussed further, innovation platforms are purposefully open 
to entry of new actors and, thereby, of new competences: the extent of contribution by 
each additional unit depends endogenously on the relative value of internal competences 
measured against the collective goal. At the core of the logic of a platform stand three 
powerful sources of increasing returns: economies of scale due to increased volumes of 
throughput; economies of scope due to lower costs of producing variations around the 
core product and services of the platform; and economies of system, that is, the creation 
of dedicated control procedures to improve utilization of the installed capacity. Another 
crucial characteristic of platforms is the functional relation in which services and manu-
facturing activities stand to one another (Suarez and Cusumano, 2009). The provision of 
some services, in fact, enables closer customer- producer interaction and opens up impor-
tant feedback mechanisms that contribute to adapting the organization of the platform, 
or some of its components, towards emerging features such as unmet customer needs, 
skill gaps, and future product developments.
Relevant dynamics within platforms span technological and organizational levels, and 
bear upon both the static and the dynamic coordination of knowledge. From a static 
viewpoint, platforms connect and integrate activities and capabilities of relevant agents 
within an industry, thus supporting specialization and favouring the accumulation of 
specifi c knowledge. From a dynamic viewpoint, platforms stimulate changes in both 
the structure of the network and the mechanisms for the governance of technological 
knowledge.
The phenomenon of innovation platforms stirs an intense debate across disciplines. 
Management scholars connect them to the challenges and the strategic implications 
associated to the emergence of open systems for production, exchange and governance 
competencies (Gerstein, 1992; Ciborra, 1996; Garud and Kuramaswamy, 1996; Ethiraj 
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and Levinthal, 2004, Jacobides and Billinger, 2006). In the policy realm innovation plat-
forms are looked at as a key reference model for the creation and management of mixed 
(that is, public and private) coalitions (European Commission, 2004). In the context of 
innovation studies Antonelli (2006) argues that platforms are especially appropriate 
when technological knowledge exhibits levels of compositeness and cumulability that 
imply too high coordination costs for a single fi rm. Recent contributions by Baumol 
(2002) and Von Hippel (2005) further stress the incentives of knowledge- sharing for 
fi rms within a platform. Effi  ciency in knowledge creation, they observe, stems from both 
internal investments and external learning and is higher than if it relied exclusively on 
either internal creation (that is, vertical integration of R&D) or external acquisition (that 
is, outsourcing of R&D and design).
Innovation platforms underpin the development of physical technologies too. These 
integrate a variety of inputs from a range of industries and fi rms and include innova-
tions such as Internet services, enhanced broadband fi bre optics, Asynchronous Digital 
Subscriber Lines, and Universal Mobile Telecommunications System. As each allows 
the integration of a variety of content, services, technologies and applications, platform- 
based technologies are both composite and fungible (Fransman, 2002; Antonelli, 2006).
Let us now draw attention to some of the dynamic properties that characterize innova-
tion platforms, namely: hierarchical causation; coordinated variety; and selective open-
ness. The juxtaposition of these three, it will be further argued, gives way to the texture 
of connections that make up innovation platforms.
3.1 Hierarchical Causation
What stimulates the emergence of collective structures such as innovation platforms? Let 
us, in answering this question, adopt a functional approach and argue that platforms are 
purposive responses to specifi c problems that no individual fi rm can solve in isolation. The 
general phenomenon is very common across most modern industries. Each fi rm possesses 
a knowledge base which is usually accumulated by blending information inputs, know- 
how and capabilities while searching for and developing innovative solutions (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982; Teece, 1986; Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). Industries with a complex 
knowledge base accelerate the obsolescence of fi rm- specifi c knowledge assets thus forcing 
them to either invest in human capital or sourcing knowledge externally. Each of these 
solutions however carries its own risk. On the one hand the adaptation of channels for 
the supply of up- to- date training depends on adjustments within and between comple-
mentary institutional domains (Vona and Consoli, 2009). In practice, highly specialized 
knowledge is sticky and therefore unlikely to become available through training programs 
quickly enough, especially knowledge that is close to the frontier. On the other hand 
signifi cant communication costs stand in the way of latent knowledge spillovers among 
fi rms. Such costs are aff ected by specifi c characteristics of the competitive environment in 
which fi rms operate (Patrucco, 2008). Either way, a fi rm under pressure needs to adopt 
eff ective governance mechanisms to overcome the barriers to creative reaction.
For example, in the auto industry in the Turin area, Fiat experienced strong competi-
tive pressure and risked failure. As a reaction, Fiat adopted governance mechanisms to 
reconfi gure the organization of internal as well as external competencies. In this new 
system, Fiat retained hierarchical control over the net of suppliers and partners.
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The notion of hierarchical causation refers to the fact that the search for knowledge 
and the associated reorganization of activities are essentially problem- based processes. 
This carries important consequences. First, newly emerged problems reverberate from 
past decisions, not necessarily because of a mistake but simply because modifi ed condi-
tions make the current set of activities no longer adequate. In this fundamental sense 
fi rms’ knowledge accumulation and learning are path dependent, that is, they are at once 
directed but also limited by the current knowledge base. Secondly, and related to the 
former, knowledge growth is an essentially uncertain process. As a result the ability to 
calculate the outcomes of each individual’s decisions as well as the strategies available to 
others is rather limited. Clearly the sources of complexity and the associated coordina-
tion challenges increase when individual actions are drawn together in collective struc-
tures like a platform. As Burt (2008) remarks, learning is not an optional attribute of 
collective structures: in dynamic environments where the scope of collaboration and the 
operative rules are liable to change, inclusion depends on the ability to remain relevant. 
That is to say, participation is contingent to learning and adaptation.
3.2 Coordinated Variety
Innovation scholars advocate that the growth of knowledge is rarely, if ever, the 
outcome of isolated action, but rather of collective learning and cumulative interactions. 
On the one hand, the development of tacit knowledge moulds individuals’ responses 
and is a source for new ideas and solutions; on the other, codifi ed and practical knowl-
edge are crucial to facilitate exchange and interactions across individuals. Contrary to 
the common view that these dimensions are dichotomic, we stress their complementary 
aspects: new knowledge grows as a result of coordination across individual experiences 
and the development of shared understanding. At the same time, variety and hetero-
geneity are not suffi  cient to replenish the knowledge base and individual specialization 
is most eff ective when coordinated through formal and informal standards (Prahalad 
and Hamel, 1990; Langlois, 2002; Antonelli, 2008). The collective character of knowl-
edge, in turn, elucidates the importance of establishing sound governance mechanisms 
(Antonelli, 2008). Previous literature sidestepped these points by assuming implicitly 
that agents learn and adapt swiftly to collective environments. If instead we focus on 
the juxtaposition of complementary dimensions such as individuals’ knowledge bases, 
routines of communication across them and the criteria that defi ne their collective scope, 
a great deal of eff ort is necessary to make these diverse pieces fi t together. For, as Nelson 
(2003) remarks, all such dimensions evolve in a symbiotic, yet uneven, fashion.
The paradigm of the system of Electronic Funds Transfer at the Point of Sale 
(EFTPOS) in the UK banking industry is a good case in point. After the 1970s the basic 
rationale of innovation in banking was the replacement of the paper- based regime with 
automated transactions along the trajectory inspired by the Automated Cash Machines 
(Consoli, 2005). The EFTPOS concept embodied the grand ambition of implementing 
a unique system of peripherals which connected directly the point of sale, that is, the 
retailer, with the terminals of the bank. This major step change in the management of 
retail payments was happening at a time when the largest clearing banks had already 
developed their own proprietary systems for the provision of other automated services. 
The philosophy underpinning EFTPOS was therefore twofold: increasing the current 
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scale of the network for payments, and expanding the number of services available to 
customers. Such a purpose required a physical infrastructure of access points, nodes 
and terminals for the management of the information fl ow as well as the harmoniza-
tion of diff use interests across diverse parties such as fi nancial institutions and retailers. 
The fi rst step in this direction was the creation of an umbrella organization, EFTPOS 
Development, under which the major fi nancial institutions were committed to col-
laborate for the defi nition of blueprints of the collective network. The initiative however 
stumbled upon lack of cooperation from its inception as the clearing banks, especially 
the largest, pursued the expansion of their proprietary schemes. This in turn led to a 
patchwork of processing systems, front- end terminals and card schemes which was inef-
fi cient for both customers and the banking fi rms. More cogently, individual proprietary 
schemes discouraged service diversifi cation (Howells and Hine, 1993; Consoli, 2008).
Later in the decade, under the pressure to reduce wasteful dual standards British 
banks resorted to the collaborative plan in a diff erent fashion, by handing the task of 
designing a common blueprint over to external organizations like LINK and BACS.6 
These two organizations brought coherence by establishing a semi- hierarchical struc-
ture in which proprietary infrastructures and end terminals adapt to a central scheme. 
Banking fi rms and retailers are therefore the peripherals of a standardized system whose 
goal is no longer maximizing traffi  c (for example economies of scale) but rather ration-
alizing it. In this new framework horizontal entry entails the involvement of previously 
unrelated organizations, for example supermarkets or specialized intermediaries like 
Paypal, which in turn stimulate the diversifi cation of retail payment services. Similarly, 
information processing in the upstream market has evolved into a self- standing business 
through increasing recourse to outsourcing.
This example illustrates the trade- off s involved in the pursuit of specialization when 
a large knowledge base is available (Kogut, 2000; Crémér, Garicano and Prat, 2007). 
In fact, such a trade- off  defi nes the scope, the boundaries and the forms of inter- 
organizational relations within a platform. On the one hand specialization favours 
effi  cient communication within a narrow set of partners but limits both the scope for 
coordination and accessibility to innovative opportunities. On the other hand the coor-
dination of a bundle of inter- fi rms and inter- organization linkages opens up new oppor-
tunities but lowers the scope for specialization and the benefi ts of communication (see 
Kogut and Zander, 1992). The implementation of innovation platforms contributes to 
reduce the ineffi  ciencies associated to these trade- off s.
3.3 Selective Openness
The problem based perspective outline so far bears another important consequence for 
the phenomenon of innovation platforms. Inclusion in collective structures for knowl-
edge sharing does not diminish the uncertainty associated to competition in fast- changing 
contexts but rather changes the nature of such uncertainty. To be viable, infrastructures 
such as innovation platforms require on the one hand a degree of stability that confers 
coherence to a shared goal and, on the other hand, room for further novelty. From this it 
follows that a necessary condition for the emergence of novelty is that a system maintains 
a degree of openness to be able to adapt to modifi ed circumstances.
The key point is that the implementation of major technical changes generates new 
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opportunities for learning but in so doing also leads to skill gaps or shortages. Empirical 
works such as those by Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000) and Bresnahan et al. (2002) dem-
onstrate that the large scale diff usion of Information and Communication Technologies 
(ICTs), often the backbone of innovation platforms, stimulates the emergence of new 
tasks and of wholly new occupations (Vona and Consoli, 2009). In turn, where match-
ing skills come from and how long it takes to correct for the imbalances depends on the 
degree of openness of the platform. The case of UK banking is again suggestive in this 
sense. The growing role of informational and strategic systems entailed an unexpected 
demand for middle- and back- offi  ce technical skills as well as new high- level manage-
rial skills, crucial for business development. In part this skill imbalance has been met by 
outsourcing of business processing. Such changes need not apply exclusively to physical 
technologies. The ability of the British National Health Service (NHS) to support the 
development of innovative practices stemming from the front line of health- care delivery 
has been a matter of debate for some time. The main culprit, it has been observed, was 
the lack of appropriate innovation management skills that would facilitate the transla-
tion of feedback from patient care into systematic (and systemic) innovation (Cooksey, 
2006). The recent creation of the Institute for Innovation and Improvement aims at 
supporting the connection between basic research and clinical practice (UK Evaluation 
Forum, 2006), as well as supporting the diff usion of improvements in routine patient 
care beyond the source unit (Department of Health, 2003). The new organizational 
platform operates across nine geographical jurisdictions within the UK through local 
hubs which off er a broad variety of services such as training, technology audits and IP 
management, to name but a few (Consoli and Patrucco, 2008). By and large the activity 
of the hubs generates benefi ts that stretch beyond the life cycle of individual solutions, be 
they medical products or clinical services. In so doing they ensure a degree of openness 
towards the screening and the absorption of new skills and forms of knowledge.
As anticipated by Richardson (1972) and reiterated by many others, when coordi-
nation between closely complementary activities and competencies is essential for the 
success of innovation fi rms rely upon a variety of inter- organizational arrangements 
– such as joint ventures, equity agreement, R&D partnerships, coalitions and consortia 
– to blend market- and contract- based and integral solutions, strong and weak relations, 
in order to acquire and coordinate the necessary productive and innovative knowledge. 
Complex and articulated governance forms emerge when the task is the coordination of 
knowledge sourced both internally and externally, and multisided learning.
Notions of ‘architectural knowledge’ (Henderson and Clark, 1990), or ‘architectural 
capability’ (Jacobides, 2006) have been put forward precisely to characterize the key 
ability possessed by networks’ leaders, to coordinate and direct the working of increas-
ingly complex organizations, and more precisely to combine and adapt elements of 
integration, such as authority, with elements of modularity, such as openness, in order 
to choose which elements and competencies are required to be included in the network.
In the car industry, for instance, this seems precisely to be the case of the design and 
development of Electric Vehicles (EVs), where large partnerships, often embedding 
public actors and newcomers, have been implemented, with the scope of learning and 
acquiring selective technological and market competencies developed outside the car 
industry strictly considered, as the illustrative evidence of the cooperation between 
Betterplace and Renault clearly suggests (Aggeri, Elmquist and Pohl, 2009; Beaume and 
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Midler, 2009). The introduction of electric vehicles (EVs) can be depicted as a collective 
innovation wherein diff erent actors such as traditional original equipment manufactur-
ers (OEMs), automobile batteries producers, utilities and system integrators contribute 
with complementary resources as well as technologies, and converge towards common 
goals and incentives. Evidence from Israeli and Danish experiences in the introduction of 
electric vehicles largely supports this view (see Beaume and Midler, 2009).
At the same time, some elements of managerial authority are still likely to characterize 
such models in that directedness is required in order to guarantee both cohesion within 
the network and the convergence of the complex system of goals, incentives and interac-
tions that characterizes such an articulated innovation process (Enrietti and Patrucco, 
2010). The entry of newcomers like Betterplace in the car industry as well as of car 
battery producers from the electronic sector that parallel the role of traditional carmak-
ers, and emerge as new platforms’ leaders, points in this direction: preliminary evidence 
on the implementation of EVs indicates that integration, coordination and direction of 
the diff erent strategies and goals of various organizations that take part in the platform 
should be a central issue not only for the platform management (Gawer, 2009) but also 
for the design of innovation and industrial policies that support the formation of broad 
coalition for innovation in the car industry.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND PROSPECTIVE RESEARCH
This chapter proposed an integration between elements of the economics of innovation 
and of complexity theory. This exercise, it has been argued, opens up interesting new 
avenues for research on the organization of innovative and productive knowledge. In 
constructing this point we illustrated the empirical case of innovation platforms as an 
emerging form of organization featuring common elements between the two research 
strands indicated above.
Building upon the pioneering analysis of Nelson and Winter (1982) scholars of innova-
tion made much headway in elaborating a framework based on the analysis of purpose-
ful yet limitedly rational agents; to overcome their intrinsic limitations these engage in 
learning activities and in so doing develop idiosyncratic capabilities and moving goals. 
Each agent is distinct and unique in relation to the way in which technological knowl-
edge is created and used and, a fortiori, in the ability to succeed. Consistent with the 
basic tenet of complexity theory, interchangeability and substitutability is limited and 
the emergent patterns of specialization are likely to display signifi cant variety. In such 
a framework the dynamic acquisition and coordination of new knowledge is the central 
issue (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997; Winter, 2002).
The concept of coalitions for innovation (Antonelli, 2010) displays its interpretative 
power precisely in this context and in our opinion deserves to be further developed and 
understood in the future as a general form of hierarchical networks, among which inno-
vation platforms are a specifi c manifestation. Coalitions emerge when the diverse incen-
tives and capabilities of a variety of heterogeneous actors are organized so as to display 
a character of alignment and convergence. In fact, ‘only the convergence of a plurality 
of complementary actions aligned though sequential chains of user- producer relations 
can shape the actual direction and speed of the process. The architecture of coalitions 
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plays a key role here’ (Antonelli, 2010: 515). The inclusion and exclusion of specifi c 
actors, characterized by idiosyncratic productive and innovative capabilities, as well as 
incentives, change the strategic behaviour of the coalition, its objectives and the likely 
actions through which these can be achieved. The need for dynamic coordination, that is, 
coordination at each point in time of the heterogeneous actors embedded in the network 
is clear, if the goal is to be the successful realization of a common innovation. In such a 
systemic context, dynamic coordination requires some forms of hierarchical organiza-
tion and yet, for the complexity involved in the system, no single fi rm commands both 
the technological and managerial resources necessary to make such coordination eff ec-
tive technologically and effi  ciently in terms of the coordination costs. Some intermediate 
forms of organization are required and it is likely that the implementation of coalitions 
centered on key fi rms and their strategic action emerges as more appropriate than 
extreme solutions such as market exchange and vertical integration. Coalitions for inno-
vation as hybrid organizational forms emerge precisely as the appropriate strategy in 
order to make possible bureaucratic organizations reacting to improvements in products 
or services by acquiring externally the know- how necessary to innovate.
In a context of distributed capabilities and knowledge often sourced externally, the 
challenge for individual fi rms is to enlarge the range of external capabilities that can be 
accessed and integrated with internal ones, while guaranteeing effi  ciency and cohesion in 
access and integration of external knowledge as well as the distinctiveness of capabili-
ties. In this chapter, also through illustrative examples derived from a variety of tech-
nologies and industries, we pay attention to the implementation of hierarchical networks 
that integrate the characteristics of distributed markets and directed organizations and 
qualify the innovation platform as a specifi c form of hierarchical network appropriate to 
govern knowledge interactions and to face that challenge.
NOTES
* The order in which the authors are listed is alphabetical and does not imply diff erential contribution. 
The authors would like to thank the participants to the BRICK workshop on ‘The System Dynamics of 
Technological Change’ held at the Collegio Carlo Alberto in Moncalieri, 4–5 December 2009, and the 
editor of this book, Cristiano Antonelli, for their stimulating feedbacks and suggestions. 
1. Of course to scholars of innovation and technological change such a statement is almost tautological since 
for years they insisted that innovation is an essentially dynamic phenomenon.
2. Complex systems are characterized by phase transition precisely because, in a non- decomposable system, a 
shock occurring to a single actor, for instance a fi rm unable to face the structural uncertainty of changing 
market conditions, has eff ects that dramatically impinge on the behavior of the interdependent actors. The 
innovation we eventually observe is exactly an emergent property of the creative reaction of the system of 
interactive fi rms to the shock and the changes in the performance of the system itself.
3. This is what Herbert Simon defi ned as a loosely coupled structure. 
4. The purpose of the paper is not to describe and compare the advantages and disadvantages of the diff erent 
structure. However, for the sake of clarity, Burt (1992) argues that networks with weak links and structural 
holes – that is, brokers that arbitrate and fl ow of knowledge between fi rms and groups of fi rms that are 
not tied to each other – are more effi  cient organizational forms and benefi t from a kind of hierarchical 
structure. On the contrary, Coleman (1990) and Uzzi (1997 and 1999), suggest that dense and redundant 
networks have a clear advantage when fi rms need to exchange and communicate complex knowledge 
because they promote trust- based relations and support more eff ectively cooperative behaviours, since 
they support repeated exchanges and a balanced distribution of power in the network.
5. The notion of innovation platforms elaborated here diff ers from that of technological platform. The 
latter accounts for ICT- based innovations like virtual networks, and the associated infrastructures, and 
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interfaces and standards (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002). Technology platforms facilitate interoperability 
and coordination between diff erent fi rms and technologies in the context of high- tech industries (see for 
example Consoli, 2005) as well as scientifi c clusters (Robinson et al., 2007). Innovation platforms are 
strategic organizational vehicles for coordinating specialized agents. ICTs and virtual networks are thus 
instrumental and yet subsidiary elements. Common to both technology and innovation platforms is the 
notion of directed and coordinated organization as opposed to ‘spontaneous’ organization typical of 
market processes.
6. Bankers Automated Clearing Services Limited (BACS) manages electronic transfer of funds between 
banks. Since 2003 BACS has become the platform for processing telephone and internet banking payments 
in the UK. LINK is the network that connects 90 per cent of ATMs in the UK’s banking system.
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